[tor-relays] A friendly reminder for all ScrambleSuit bridge operators.

[Yawning Angel]

Hello all,

This is a friendly reminder to all ScrambleSuit bridge operators that
unless you are running tor-0.2.5.x, you should not be running a
ScrambleSuit bridge.

This is because the method for propagating the ScrambleSuit password
(or any other future pluggable transport server side argument) for
inclusion in the Bridge line served from BridgeDB was implemented in
0.2.5.x, and is not present in 0.2.4.x, and to make matters worse,
0.2.4.x has a bug that will allow this configuration to run instead of
failing with an error[0].

If you are running a ScrambleSuit bridge with tor-0.2.4.x, it is
useless.  Users that happen to be served your ScrambleSuit bridge will
not be able to connect, because the password is missing.

Approximately 1/7th of the ScrambleSuit bridges in BridgeDB exhibit
this behavior and we will most likely start filtering them on the
BridgeDB side.

Please see https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13202 if you
wish to know more about this.

Best Regards,

-- 
Yawning Angel

[0]: Apparently this is not worth patching 0.2.4.x for, which I
personally view as unfortunate.
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