[tor-relays] Anonbox Project

isis isis at torproject.org
Wed Oct 15 13:47:09 UTC 2014


Sven Reissmann transcribed 2.4K bytes:
> Hi there,
> 
> I recently read about the anonbox project [1], a small hardware-router,
> which allows end-users to connect their whole LAN to the Tor network.
> The project is on kickstarter at the moment [2].
> 
> Has there already been a discussion on how this might affect the
> performance of the Tor network?

Yes and no.

One of the Anonabox developers, August Germar, posted to their kickstarter
page that the distributed Anonaboxes would have a checkout option to be
relays/bridges by default. [0] Colin Mahns responded to this, [1] pointing out
some of my recent discussions with Mike Perry and others on the tor-dev list
on scaling the Tor network. [2] [3] (And August Germar responded in their
Reddit AMA. [4])

I agree with Colin that the Anonabox folks seem to be well-intentioned.
However, the network effects, were these routers to be distributed, and were a
majority of them to be configured as relays by default, would likely be
harmful due to the low bandwidth of most residential connections.

That said, I think that everyone here would welcome the chance for a
pocket-sized FLOSS router which enforces safe Tor usage. If that is their
goal, and they are able to communicate honestly with users, I'd like to help
them succeed. Particularly if it means someone else does hardware development,
since that's not really my jam. :)

[0]: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/augustgermar/anonabox-a-tor-hardware-router/posts/1017625
[1]: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/augustgermar/anonabox-a-tor-hardware-router/posts/1017625?cursor=8115567#comment-8115566
[2]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-September/007558.html
[3]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-September/007560.html
[4]: https://www.reddit.com/r/anonabox/comments/2ja22g/hi_im_august_germar_a_developer_for_the_anonabox/cl9u17k

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