[tor-relays] Scramblesuit

[Chris Whittleston]

Thanks, will look at that link - sounds interesting indeed! Maybe something
to play with in the future.
On 2 Oct 2014 01:24, "isis" <isis at torproject.org> wrote:

> Chris Whittleston transcribed 5.0K bytes:
> > I'm right in thinking that running scramblesuit is not going to do
> anything
> > for a middle relay correct?
>
> Correct.
>
> Pluggable Transports are (normally) used for hiding that one is speaking
> the
> Tor protocol (also they could be used to disguise any protocol). [0] A
> middle
> relay, or any normal non-bridge relay, is listed in the consensus, meaning
> that anyone who looks at the consensus already knows you're speaking Tor.
>
> All of that said, scramblesuit and obfs4 both have some interesting
> protections against traffic fingerprinting via timing correlations and
> packet
> size distributions, meaning that (if there were a way to do this) relays
> could
> use PTs between them to protect against some correlations. Doing this
> would be
> super weird. No one has done yet, to my knowledge, a security analysis of
> how
> running PTs in between normal relays would change things. That analysis
> would
> be really interesting.
>
> [0]: See
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/AChildsGardenOfPluggableTransports
>      for visual explanation of how some of the different PTs change your
>      traffic.
>
> --
>  ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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