[tor-relays] Relay configuration for FreedomBox

Roger Dingledine arma at mit.edu
Sun Mar 23 07:33:10 UTC 2014

On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 01:03:43PM -0700, Lance Hathaway wrote:
> On the plus side, obfs3 is still pretty strong, and it's one of the
> common pluggable transports right now. Scramblesuit is not live in the
> official bundles yet (AFAIK), but it just released and has some pretty
> robust-looking defenses against active probing and other attacks. If
> you're working on something new to deploy, these should be included,
> without a doubt. They may indeed be deprecated in future, and in the
> worst case may become unusable or make the bridge more susceptible to
> being blocked. But if you go with a plain bridge or obfs2, you're
> already in your worst-case scenario. You have nothing to lose and
> everything to gain by enabling the newest pluggable transports.

Agreed. If the goal in setting it up as a bridge is to be useful to
users who are otherwise censored from the Tor network, then running
pluggable transports like obfs3 and ScrambleSuit will go a long way
towards actually doing that.

For context, currently Tor works out-of-the-box (you don't even need a
bridge) in nearly all countries except China, where vanilla bridges and
obfs2 don't work currently:

Periodically Iran and Syria block SSL by DPI, which also takes out
vanilla bridges.

If you want to be conservative, pick obfs3 and wait for ScrambleSuit
to get more mature.

> I would highly recommend adding the Tor package repository to the
> FreedomBoxes. As explained in [0], this won't always give you the
> latest version of tor, but it will provide security fixes. My hunch is
> that it will almost always also be a little fresher than Debian
> stable.

Yes -- I would consider doing this as much for security as for anything
else. Debian stable can lag pretty far behind the actual Tor stable
releases (depending on which year you're looking).


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