[tor-relays] Exit node re-writing PKI certificates?

mick mbm at rlogin.net
Thu Mar 20 11:08:59 UTC 2014

On Wed, 19 Mar 2014 23:55:53 -0400
Iggy <iggy19 at riseup.net> allegedly wrote:

> I am assuming there is no way to tell this now, after the fact?
> -iggy
> On 03/19/2014 11:08 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> > Really useful to know at this point would be the complete suspicious
> > certificate (which would e.g. tell us who signed it) and the exit
> > node in use.
> > 
> > On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 11:00 PM, Iggy <iggy19 at riseup.net> wrote:
> >> Hey all,
> >>
> >> I use an email account from riseup.net, which I usually access via
> >> Thunderbird, running on a linux machine.

According to torstatus.blutmagie.de, cab.cabinethardwareparts.com is on (See

It has fast, exit, guard and stable flags set.

The node is apparently unnamed, but there is a whois record. See



 Mick Morgan
 gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B  72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312


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