[tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies

Lance Hathaway qhltx at yahoo.com
Mon Jul 21 16:21:23 UTC 2014

On 21/07/2014 7:34 AM, Thomas White wrote:
> Seemed a little targeted at me and I am the one agreeing with you xD

Wasn't so much targeted at you, as I was chiming in to agree with what
you had said. :) Just in my own words.

> Furthermore, I'm going to see what the authority directories think
> about his relay because that is just playing silly bugger only
> allowing bitcoin related traffic.

I don't see an issue with his relay only choosing to allow bitcoin
traffic. Again, that comes down to allowing each relay operator to allow
or reject whatever ports they are comfortable with through their relays.
Just as we can't go around censoring services however we please, we
can't go around telling relay operators that they need to allow
arbitrary traffic on our say-so.

If he only allows a single port, he won't get the Exit flag (as long as
the policy on that flag is that any two of [HTTP, HTTPS, IRC] must be
exited). As far as the rest goes, As long as he's using the Tor-readable
method of limiting ports (ExitPolicy, rather than some silly buggered
firewall that Tor can't understand), my opinion would be to leave him be.


-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 964 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20140721/97516834/attachment-0001.sig>

More information about the tor-relays mailing list