[tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies
thomaswhite at riseup.net
Mon Jul 21 14:34:39 UTC 2014
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Seemed a little targeted at me and I am the one agreeing with you xD
Anyway yes this is what I stated originally before the pro-censorship
people come out of their caves. Once the tools are developed to
censor, it is very easy to start blocking arbitrarily. Imagine the day
our ISP's say "now block x and y hidden services because we don't like
them or we'll close your account". I can see the reasons some people
block ports, which comes back to my "greater good" argument that
keeping their relays online albeit have some ports blocked is better
than no relay, because users in that situation can route around it if
So I think we're agreed. No tool for censoring, not even a step near
that direction because it rapidly goes downhill from there. Again I
reiterate, the fact that Mike Hearn has come to Tor Project (with his
own relay only allowing bitcoin traffic is particularly peeving me
off) and tried to tell us to develop tools of censorship, has
particularly annoyed me. So to address this, I'll be sending a copy
of his proposal to some friends of mine on the bitcoin scene.
Furthermore, I'm going to see what the authority directories think
about his relay because that is just playing silly bugger only
allowing bitcoin related traffic.
On 21/07/2014 15:25, Lance Hathaway wrote:
> On 21/07/2014 6:21 AM, Thomas White wrote:
>> Also note, botnets in this sense are not the topic. The proposal
>> is an easy mechanism to censor hidden services and let it not be
>> portrayed as anything other than that. ...
>> So to state clearly:
>> Should Tor Project develop a system to filter hidden services?
> The simple fact of the matter is this: However good and pure our
> intentions may be ("We'll only block malware and child porn!"), a
> system would have to be developed to allow us to block arbitrary
> Something I have noticed which trips up most people is their
> inability to see beyond themselves. YOU may have only the best
> intentions. YOU may never countenance blocking inconvenient truths
> on Twitter / Slashdot / news-feed-of-the-day. But once a system is
> created that can block arbitrary services, it's only a matter of
> time before somebody with intentions less pure than your own decide
> to start blocking other things. Maybe somebody with an upright
> moral standing decides it would be better to block everything PG-13
> and up. Maybe somebody decides their government is taking too much
> flack on an issue, and tries to "help out" by filtering some news
> sites they feel are particularly biased. Maybe I decide that
> tabloid magazines are total trash, and nobody should be allowed to
> give them business so they'll just die off in the end.
> Why would we want to replace a system of government censorship
> with censorship-by-the-masses? I thought we wanted to decide for
> ourselves--what we read, to whom we listen, what we do, and with
> whom we associate.
> (Never mind the legal fact that, if we CAN filter / exert
> legitimate control over the traffic flowing over the network,
> somebody will figure out a way to MAKE us do so--and it may not be
> what we personally agree should be blocked.)
> Insofar as botnets create an infrastructure problem with Tor (ie.
> the HSDir mobbing issue), that's something that we can work on
> addressing. Maybe a more load-tolerant design or what-have-you.
> Filtering things is not the answer.
> (I should add as a final note: filtering ports is not the same as
> filtering sites or traffic. I don't care what traffic passes over
> port 80, nor should I. But traffic on port 25 gets me marked as a
> spammer and shuts down my exit nodes, so I can't have that. Anybody
> who wants to change that traffic to tunnel over port 80 or 22 or
> whatever is free to do so, and I do not and should not know about
> it. If I can find a provider within my budget range who allows full
> exits and lets me handle all the abuse issues myself, I dare say
> I'll allow all ports through that exit.)
> -Lance _______________________________________________ tor-relays
> mailing list tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
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