[tor-relays] Exits behind a next-gen firewall? Opinions please
jvictors at jessevictors.com
Thu Jul 10 23:23:09 UTC 2014
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I've been running some exit nodes for some time now, and they're doing well. They've burned through many terabytes of bandwidth, and thanks to Tor's recommended reduced exit policy, complaints have been minimal. Clearly the vast majority of the Tor traffic is not malicious, but I have received some reports from other companies and from my ISP of hacking attempts: SQL Injection, XSS, botnet C&C, basic things like that. My ISP now tells me that they could reduce the reports even further by routing the exits through a "next-generation firewall" which apparently can detect an obvious clearnet attack and drop that connection a few milliseconds after the attack occurs. I don't know how the firewall works in detail, perhaps it has the ability to drop a specific connection rather than drop all access to the destination IP for a while, nor do I know how it would interact with Tor's traffic patterns out of an exit. I'm posting here for opinions.
My question is, is this a good idea, and if so, any advice? Does anyone have any experience with such a setup?
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