[tor-relays] specifying your own entrance and exit nodes

[usprey]

Inline below.

On 11 December 2014 at 01:46, tor-exit0 <tor-exit0 at intersafeit.com> wrote:

> On 12/10/2014 4:52 PM, usprey wrote:
>
> > I do not have a full understanding of how the DirAuth works, but how
> > about an out of band verification process, to ensure the
> > trustworthiness, for exit nodes specifically. This would minimize the
> > hazzle for people who wishes to use trusted exit nodes, and maximize the
> > number of explicitly trusted exit nodes.
>
> How would the trust be quantified by such a verification process?


You could use existing web of trust systems to let maintainers sign the
relays fingerprint.
In addition to this users could also sign the fingerprint and the exit
would first be flagged trusted when a critical mass of users have signed.
I'm aware this breaks anonymity, but would be a way to flag an exit as
trusted.


> For
> example, how would this prevent the operator of a good exit from
> changing their mind about tampering with traffic or the cooperation of
> one or more exit owners in monitoring or sharing traffic information for
> correlation?


It won't, but the maintainer would be putting her name and reputation on
the line, in the web of trust fingerprint scenario above. Code words for
trust is openness and accountability.
I'm not aware how one acquires a bad exit flag, but it should be possible
to automate tests verifying non-interference with exit connections.


> I'd also be curious how such a system would stand up in the
> event that control over a validated exit is compromised without the
> owner realizing it.


I suspect that most people contributing +100Mbps bandwidth, are in some way
IT professionals and know what they are doing and have followed the general
guidelines for physical, network and software security.
A signing process for a maintainer could also include a statement of
compliance with specific guidelines.


> It seems to me that most validation techniques offer
> a trade off between accountability and anonymity which may also pose a
> concern for some people.
>

Definitely, why it shouldn't be mandatory, but a way to flag trusted and
accountable exits.


>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20141211/a5f0efc5/attachment.html>