[tor-relays] specifying your own entrance and exit nodes

[tor-exit0]

On 12/10/2014 4:52 PM, usprey wrote:

> I do not have a full understanding of how the DirAuth works, but how
> about an out of band verification process, to ensure the
> trustworthiness, for exit nodes specifically. This would minimize the
> hazzle for people who wishes to use trusted exit nodes, and maximize the
> number of explicitly trusted exit nodes. 

How would the trust be quantified by such a verification process? For
example, how would this prevent the operator of a good exit from
changing their mind about tampering with traffic or the cooperation of
one or more exit owners in monitoring or sharing traffic information for
correlation? I'd also be curious how such a system would stand up in the
event that control over a validated exit is compromised without the
owner realizing it. It seems to me that most validation techniques offer
a trade off between accountability and anonymity which may also pose a
concern for some people.


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