[tor-relays] exit policy to reflect country-wide ban

Vladimir Ivanov ivlad at yandex.com
Thu Dec 4 14:55:10 UTC 2014


hi.

Recently, github was blocked in Russia (see discussion here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8692584). The ban is executed by all major ISPs (comply with this regulation is necessary to keep the telecom license so no ISP is risking to disobey), this means that if your exit node happens to be in Russia, you're out of luck when you try to connect to github.

Some suggest marking exit nodes in Russia as bad exits because connecting via them leads to various problems (like node provider doing MitM on all github https connections). Here is an example: https://twitter.com/wiretapped/status/539934125293961216

I think, if Russian exits operators implement reduced policy rejecting github, that would be better solution: they're still usefull for all other sites and a client would access github using a tor exit elsewhere.

Do I miss something here? Are any disatvantages of this?

More general, if a network, a particular exit node is connected to, blocks some IP addresses, is it wise to reflect those changes in the node's ExitPolicy?

BR,
Vladimir


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