[tor-relays] "What fraction of the tor network by consensus weight are the openssl-vulnerable relays?"

Kostas Jakeliunas kostas at jakeliunas.com
Sat Apr 19 01:45:10 UTC 2014

On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 3:49 AM, Kostas Jakeliunas <kostas at jakeliunas.com>wrote:

> Making a separate thread so as not to pollute the challenger[1] one.
> Roger: you wanted to know (times are UTC if anyone cares),
> [22:08:35] [...] we now have a list of 1000 fingerprints, and we could
>> pretend those are in the challenge and use our graphing/etc plans on them
>> [22:08:45] they happen to be the relays vulnerable to our openssl bug
>> [22:11:43] "what fraction of the tor network by consensus weight are
>> they?"
>> [22:11:49] "over time"
> Given them[2], the challenger (with minimal changes to fix downloader and
> to make Onionoo not falter)[4] will spit out the following results:
>   -
> http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-bandwidth.json
>   -
> http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-weights.json
>   -
> http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-clients.json[uh oh, this one's empty. Why is it empty? Didn't look into it.]
>   -
> http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln1024-combined-uptime.json
> The 'combined-weights.json' is probably the one you might be after. But
> that's all I did for now.
> You also said that these aren't all the vulnerable relays that there are
> out there. You linked to a more complete list[3], but it has some typos,
> etc. I haven't done anything with it, maybe someone will take over, or I
> will do something later on.

fwiw, this is a beyond-hacky-could-fail quick thing[5] that gives you
fingerprints of relays that were vulnerable in a recent
vulnerable-relay-file[6] (ideally it would pull those vulnerable relays
from some online source) that are in any consensus provided (default is
latest consensus available in Tor Metrics):


Provide consensus using "/consensus/%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S" (standard UTC date

Consensuses are available since ~2008. So e.g. current vulnerable relay
fingerprint list intersected with an older consensus when there were
heartbleeding openssl versions:

http://ravinesmp.com:7777/consensus/2012-10-20%2016:00:00 ("
http://ravinesmp.com:7777/consensus/2012-10-20 16:00:00")

There's also a nice concise Nick's script to get the % of network bandwidth
of any given list of relay fingerprints (bandwidth is the one in the
consensus, so parts of it will be self-reported and parts of it will be

[5]: https://gist.github.com/wfn/11070928
[6]: http://freehaven.net/~arma/vulnerable-keys-2014-04-08b
[7]: https://gist.github.com/nmathewson/10309480

> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-April/004214.html
> [2]: http://ravinesmp.com/volatile/challenger-stuff/vuln_fingerprints.txt
> [3]: http://freehaven.net/~arma/vulnerable-keys-2014-04-08b
> [4]: commits:
>   -
> https://github.com/wfn/challenger/commit/38d88bcb1136f97881f81152d3d883c4e9480188
>   -
> https://github.com/wfn/challenger/commit/39c800643c040474402fc62d2a2db75c25889dfc
>   -
> https://github.com/wfn/challenger/commit/7425ef6fc00dedf3b2b7f2649e832fb4c93909ae
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