[tor-relays] Rejecting 380 vulnerable guard/exit keys

Martin Kepplinger martink at posteo.de
Wed Apr 16 07:35:22 UTC 2014

Am 16.04.2014 06:42 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
> Hi folks,
> I'm attaching the list of relay identity fingerprints that I'm
> rejecting on moria1 as of yesterday.
> I got the list from Sina's scanner:
> https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/
> I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag rather
> than rejecting them outright, but this way they'll get notices
> in their logs.
> I also thought for a while about trying to keep my list of 
> fingerprints
> up-to-date (i.e. removing the !reject line once they've upgraded their
> openssl), but on the other hand, if they were still vulnerable as of
> yesterday, I really don't want this identity key on the Tor network 
> even
> after they've upgraded their openssl.
> If the other directory authority operators follow suit, we'll lose 
> about
> 12% of the exit capacity and 12% of the guard capacity.

How is that going to be decided?

> I/we should add to this list as we discover other relays that come
> online with vulnerable openssl versions.
> Also these are just the relays with Guard and/or Exit flags, so we 
> should
> add the other 1000+ at some point soon.
> --Roger

Thanks for your work!

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