[tor-relays] Heartbleed" Exchange of keys now or later?

Chris Whittleston csw34 at cam.ac.uk
Wed Apr 9 14:37:43 UTC 2014


I've also noticed a big uptick in traffic in the last 24/48 hours which has
somewhat overwhelmed my poor Raspberry Pi :( guess we sit tight and wait
for things to settle.
On 9 Apr 2014 15:27, "Sebastian Urbach" <sebastian at urbach.org> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I recall that Roger Dingledine pointed out that this is a stress situation
> for the whole network, but the flags should be in order in just a few days
> time.
>
> Better to update OpenSSL right now, discard everything in /keys and wait
> for the recovery. I expect that the vast majority of the systems should be
> back to business as usual in about 2-3 days.
>
>
>
> After updating the OpenSSL, I chopped our relay's keys at noon EST
> yesterday. The traffic has indeed collapsed since then. Old configuration
> was averaging around 55Mb/s per my Cacti. A URL here:
>
> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/566B0F92197A9D855846E68D2AEEF8
> 266B147D35
>
> This morning my Cacti graphs say it is still sitting at near nothing, like
> 1.5Mb. "arm" says between 500-600Kb/s. The new URL is here and at least at
> this time, you can really see the dropoff in the 3-day graph.
>
> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/30C19B81981F450C402306E2E7CFB6
> C3F79CB6B2
>
> I wonder how long it will take our relays to recover?
>
> I wonder if it is a good idea, or technically feasible, to do a one time
> kick-over of something in the Tor network so that the system sees what the
> relay flags etc. should be on these emergency-redefined relays. Certainly
> if everyone updated at once and the traffic died like this everywhere, Tor
> would be pretty messed.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20140409/be5a2d62/attachment.html>


More information about the tor-relays mailing list