[tor-relays] Relays vulnerable to OpenSSL bug: Please upgrade

mick mbm at rlogin.net
Tue Apr 8 15:35:39 UTC 2014

On Tue, 08 Apr 2014 17:01:18 +0200
Moritz Bartl <moritz at torservers.net> allegedly wrote:

> On 04/08/2014 04:58 PM, ecarter9 at riseup.net wrote:
> > Greetings all.  I follwed the above instructions on my relay.  Upon
> > restarting Tor I have lost all of my flags and I have a new
> > fingerprint. Previously I had the Fast, Guard, Named, Running,
> > Stable, and Valid flags. Is this expected?  Did I miss a step
> > somewhere?  Thanks for any help.
> Yes. You made it generate new keys, so it is a "new relay" as far as
> Tor is concerned. This is why not everybody should generate new keys
> immediately, especially larger relays. But don't worry too much,
> you'll get your flags back eventually. :)

But Roger's blog post makes no mention of the advisability (or
otherwise) of a mass re-generation of keys. All it says is that best
practice states this would be a good idea.

(I have regenerated mine and restarted so I too now have a shiny a new



 Mick Morgan
 gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B  72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312


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