[tor-relays] non-exit risks?

krishna e bera keb at cyblings.on.ca
Sat Sep 21 03:08:27 UTC 2013


On 13-09-20 11:23 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote:
> On 09/20/2013 04:17 PM, That Guy wrote:
>> ...  I have experienced issues
>> running a non-exit relay pretty soon after it going up and though I have
>> no idea if there is a connection, I started to get more trouble after
>> the doubling of connections at the end of July.
> 
> Yes, unfortunately more and more sites block Tor relay IPs, regardless
> of whether they allow exiting (to that site) or not. All that helps here
> is friendly education. Whenever you notice something like that, contact
> the site owner or blocklist maintainer and teach them about the problem
> and how to properly detect Tor exits, namely
> 
> https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py
> https://www.torproject.org/projects/tordnsel.html.en

Once the network gets big enough so that each node and client doesnt
know all the nodes ip addresses, is there a compelling reason that ip
addresses of relays which are non-exit and non-guard need to be
published to the outside world at all?  Then if someone ran a Tor node
just to leak node ip addresses, it might be easy to figure out who it
was and drop them from the network, and they would at least be
contributing bandwidth.



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