[tor-relays] max TCP interruption before Tor circuit teardown?

Gordon Morehouse gordon at morehouse.me
Sun Oct 27 21:32:55 UTC 2013


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krishna e bera:
> On 13-10-20 12:42 PM, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
>> First, during a SYN flood type overload, some peers which have 
>> *existing* circuits built through the relay and are sending SYNs
>> as normal traffic, will stochastically get "caught" in the filter
>> and banned for a short time.  If these hosts already have
>> circuits open through the relay which is overloaded, I would
>> prefer to preserve those circuits rather than break them.  My
>> defensive strategy versus overload here is to throttle new
>> circuit creation requests, *not* to break existing circuits. ... 
>> If a tor relay has a circuit built through a peer, and the peer
>> starts dropping 100% of packets, how long will it take before the
>> relay with the circuit "gives up" on the circuit and tears it
>> down?  I want to set my temp ban time *below* this timeout.
>> Thus, unlucky peers that were caught in the filter and have
>> circuits already built through the relay they will experience a
>> brief performance degradation, but they won't lose their active
>> circuits through the overloaded relay, and in the meantime
>> hopefully the overload condition is becoming resolved.
>> 
>> Is there such a timeout?  There must be.  Can someone tell me
>> what it is?
>> 
> 
> Would something like an conntrack-tools help? Maybe it provides
> more direct connection control than trying to game the timings. 
> http://conntrack-tools.netfilter.org/

Probably would, though it might be faster to slink over to tor-dev and
ask, get a dev to notice in here (which is what I'm trying to do ;)),
or dig through the source code myself - I'm not a C programmer but I
can read it okay.

> Also, to what extent would/could the Tor network (or a small group
> of nodes) count as a "high availability cluster" for entry
> firewalling purposes?  Would clustering help protect against timing
> attacks on relays or hidden services?

You mean, if you have a circuit, sending some bytes of I/O over entry
node A, some over entry node B, etc?  Not quite sure what you're asking.

> (I lack expertise or resources to answer any of the above, but
> reading Gordon Morehouse's project got me searching and curious.)

I'm glad it's doing somebody some good, or taking up time that
could've been otherwise wasted on Buzzfeed or something ;) Not that
you'd do that. ;)

Best,
- -Gordon M.


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