[tor-relays] Reimbursement of Exit Operators

Andy Isaacson adi at hexapodia.org
Tue Oct 1 19:00:49 UTC 2013


On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 09:07:14PM +0300, J.C. wrote:
> Another amateur relay operator here, i run the node "namelesshero"
> and I sure hope however this cost reimbursing plan eventually pans
> out, it won't discourage small folk like us from running relays. I,
> too, believe the exact opposite is desirable instead. I'll admit i'm
> not quite sure if i understand the concept here but mixing monetary
> compensation with voluntary activity doesn't sound good to me at a
> first look.

I'm the operator of the noisetor exits (tor.noisebridge.net).

We're currently fairly comfortable on the money side, just based on
individual supporters' donations (and a few large donations as well).
I don't have a problem with the Reimbursement program, although Noisetor
is not currently planning to participate due to a lack of need on our
end.  I certainly hear your concern, JC, about the potential for $$ to
drive out volunteer operators.

While it's not entirely clear, it seems from experience that large/fast
exits are more beneficial to the network than small/slow exits.
However, centralization is bad for the network, too.

I think that the best thing we could do as a community is increase the
number of fast-but-not-too-big exits,  I'd like to see a lot more 100
Mbps Fast/Stable/Exit nodes run by individual operators.  (I'd also like
to see a few more 300 - 500 Mbps exits to compete at the top of the list
with Torservers, Noisetor, DFRI, torland, et al.)

These servers cost enough to run that it's probably good, overall, to
provide a way for the costs to be borne by the larger organization.
Hopefully the Reimbursement program will help, there.

I'm pretty skeptical of the conspiracy theories around Tor.  The Project
is extremely open with their financial, organizational, and technical
aspects.  The most principled, anti-authoritarian, paranoid,
willing-to-go-public-in-a-minute-if-necessary hackers I know work at
Tor, and if there were even the slightest hint of collusion with the
surveillance state I'm extremely confident that it would be exposed in
moments.

-andy


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