[tor-relays] Hello guys. Is is possible to choose one's Entry Guards?

Konstantinos Asimakis inshame at gmail.com
Fri Jan 11 13:29:22 UTC 2013

Do you mean how many can you use I in parallel for different circuits? Or
how many you can put one after the other?

I'm pretty sure that without changing the source code you can only use one
bridge at the start of each circuit. Now if you mean in parallel I don't
know how Tor behaves if you give it a list of, let's say, 10 bridges BUT,
in any case, keep in mind that the more bridge nodes you connect directly
to, the more you risk connecting to a compromised one which can lead to
timing attacks.

BTW you should take the conversation to the tor-talk list since it's not
about relays or hidden service operators anymore (and I'm not even sure if
this list is for hidden service operators either).

On 09/01/2013 11:35 PM, "Coyo" <coyo at darkdna.net> wrote:

>  On 1/9/2013 2:57 PM, Coyo wrote:
> On 1/9/2013 4:41 AM, Konstantinos Asimakis wrote:
>  First of all, AFAIK, bridge relays act as entry guards, meaning they
> *replace* the first step of your tor circuits, they don't extend them to 4
> nodes.
> When I say "entry guards" i mean entry guards from the perspective of a
> tor node acting as a client.
> Am i mistaken in believing that a tor bridge relay acts as a client on
> behalf of the actual tor client behind it?
> Or does the short list of bridge relays act as entry guards, and connect
> to other tor relays as the first hop tor relay?
> Oh, I misread that. Nevermind!
> Though I have another question!
> How many bridge relays, with or without protocol obfuscation, can you use
> simultaneously?
> Is there a limit? Can you configure that limit?
> Are bridge relays in the list written to torrc chosen at random up to a
> certain limit?
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