[tor-relays] My Relay has slowed significantly.

[Konstantinos Asimakis]

If you are an insurgent communicating with your comrades, the moment your
government sees that you visit some suspicious sites, they will simply get
a warrant (or not), get in your house, and use a $5 wrench on you till you
start spewing names or cooperate with them and help them catch the rest of
your comrades. I don't think they'll just keep watching your connection
silently.

In other words most governments would prefer to peek once per day into each
tor circuit than having the ability to constantly monitor a specific subset
of all circuits. The former would practically make Tor useless since anyone
running a few guard nodes and a few exit nodes would be able create a graph
of users and the sites they visit through Tor.

In most cases, there is no way to get "a little" f'ed up unless we are
talking about sharing MP3s over Tor.

-----
My blog: http://www.inshame.com
My full signature with lots of links etc: http://bit.ly/trtsig


On Sun, Feb 3, 2013 at 5:08 PM, Roman Mamedov <rm at romanrm.ru> wrote:

> On Sun, 3 Feb 2013 16:53:21 +0200
> Konstantinos Asimakis <inshame at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > that someone peeks constantly into your circuits (well 1/3rd of them)
> for a
> > long time, which is not really worse than peeking for a day into them.
>
> Observing for a long period allows to build some profile on the user,
> observing
> for a short time is much more harmless. To continue quoting for you from
> tor-talk, "...to me it just seems to be an elaborate trade off that
> results in
> "if you are f***ed, ensure you are f***ed as completely as possible and
> with
> the most dire consequences possible".
>
> "An adversary has a chance to see some of my entry traffic for some time"
>
> ...seems rather harmless to me compared to the Guards system's of:
>
> "an adversary has a chance to see ALL of my entry traffic for a long
> period"
>
> --
> With respect,
> Roman
>
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