[tor-relays] My Relay has slowed significantly.

[Konstantinos Asimakis]

But if you constantly switch guard nodes then chances are that very soon
you will use at the same time two compromised nodes, probably revealing
which sites you visit. Also Tor users usually use Tor to visit specific
sites, not generally browse the web, so even if someone peeks into their
circuits once, he can get a good idea of what the user uses Tor for. So
fixing the guard nodes means that either no one peeks into your circuits or
that someone peeks constantly into your circuits (well 1/3rd of them) for a
long time, which is not really worse than peeking for a day into them.

I don't follow tor-talk.

I wouldn't mind of course having the option of excluding your node from the
guard position.

-----
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My full signature with lots of links etc: http://bit.ly/trtsig


On Sun, Feb 3, 2013 at 4:42 PM, Roman Mamedov <rm at romanrm.ru> wrote:

> On Sun, 3 Feb 2013 16:14:07 +0200
> Konstantinos Asimakis <inshame at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Why would traffic fall after becoming a guard node? Aren't guard nodes
> > selected as middle nodes too?
>
> "clients avoid using relays with the Guard flag for hops other than the
> first hop, since they assume they've got lots of load from clients who
> are using them for the first hop -- but when you first get your Guard
> flag, nobody uses you as a guard yet, so you don't have much traffic."
> -- arma at mit.edu
>
> You don't follow tor-talk@?
>
> > > Personally I don't agree with the theory behind "Guards", and it is
> highly
> > > annoying that there is no way to prevent nodes from becoming Guard.
> > >
> > What don't you agree with? With the fact that Tor sticks to a set of
> three
> > nodes for the first hop of each circuit
>
> This ^
>
>
> > or with the way the guard flag is awarded to nodes?
>
> There should exist a torrc option of "I don't want it, dammit."
>
> --
> With respect,
> Roman
>
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