[tor-relays] new relays

[Niles Rogoff]

I think that's part of the joke


On Sat, Aug 31, 2013 at 12:32 AM, Andrea Shepard <andrea at torproject.org>wrote:

> On Sat, Aug 31, 2013 at 12:27:22AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> > On 8/30/13, Andrea Shepard <andrea at torproject.org> wrote:
> > > On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 11:08:34AM -0500, Jon Gardner wrote:
> > >> Then why have exit policies? Exit nodes regularly block "unwelcome"
> > >> traffic
> > >> like bittorrent, and there's only a slight functional difference
> between
> > >> that
> > >> and using a filter in front of the node to block things like porn
> > >
> > > There's a considerable functional difference: an exit policy is a
> defined
> > > list of specific hosts and ports to accept/reject, and it's advertised
> in
> > > the exit's descriptor.  Your client can just pick a different exit node
> > > if the connection it wants to make is not permitted by a given exit's
> > > policy.
> > > A "porn filter" is inherently fuzzy and unpredictable, so couldn't be
> > > implemented without breaking clients trying to use that node.
>  Filtering
> > > traffic other than as declared by your exit policy should and will get
> your
> > > exit the BadExit flag.
> >
> >
> > This is why we need to implement extended exit flags for exits that want
> > to run post-exit filtering/enhancement policies, say for example
> >   "noporn"
> > that way we can get all the religious groups dumping their tithes into
> > not just beaming reruns of the 700 club around the world, but a pile of
> > uber fast exits too.
>
> What a disastrous notion; the exit policy system works because clients can
> predict in advance whether an exit will pass a given connection; it depends
> only on the destination host/port.  That could never be the case for any
> of these.
>
> > And how about
> >  "novirus" delivered by microsoft
> >  "doublesyourcoins" propped up by the donations of fools
> >  "trusted" run by legit governments
>
> Oh, please, do tell where you expect to find a 'legit' government and why
> one should 'trust' it?
>
> --
> Andrea Shepard
> <andrea at torproject.org>
> PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF  DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536
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>
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