[tor-relays] Experience with obfuscated bridge on Raspberry Pi Raspian

[TonyXue]

>China's internet censorship / 'firewall' thing seems to have been trying to enumerate bridges for a while now. Yes, it does. I guess it's actually detecting bridges from users. The bridges become 'one-off', you can only use those bridges one time(at least in a period of time) and the second time you try to connect through the same bridges, it won't work.

From: tony.x at outlook.com
To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
Subject: RE: [tor-relays] Experience with obfuscated bridge on Raspberry Pi Raspian
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 18:42:41 +0800




>China's internet censorship / 'firewall' thing seems to have been trying to enumerate bridges for a while now. 

Yes, it does. I guess it's actually detecting bridges from users. The bridges become 'one-off', you can only use those bridges one time(at least in a period of time) and the second time you try to connect through the same bridges, it won't work.
From: kostas at jakeliunas.com
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 13:01:35 +0300
To: tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Experience with obfuscated bridge on Raspberry Pi	Raspian

Thanks for sharing your experience!
> After the week I decided to shut the bridge down because I heard from people being contacted by the police even though only running a non-exit relay.


Do you remember where you did hear this? Was it in writing, are you by chance maybe able to link to it? It would be interesting to know more.


All non-bridge relays (exit or non-exit) can be enumerated by anyone (that's by design); this is not the case with bridges. However I suppose the extent to which any potential efforts to do just that may be happening does very much depend on the jurisdiction where that bridge is being run; China's internet censorship / 'firewall' thing seems to have been trying to enumerate bridges for a while now. [1] In any case, as far as I'm concerned, it would be *really* interesting to hear of any incidents between the police and non-exit relay operators.


[1]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/knock-knock-knockin-bridges-doors



On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 2:00 AM, z0rc <damian.goeldi at gmail.com> wrote:


Hi,



As lately there were many discussions on getting Tor from the experimental repository running on Raspian, I thought I would share my experiences here.



First, I tried to install Tor following [1] and [2] and ran into the same compatibility issues as most of you. But then I just downloaded the soft-float version of Raspian "wheezy" from [3]. And I could install Tor and obsproxy from the experimental repository without any issues (i.e. without any compiling or complex configurations).





I ran the obfuscated bridge for a week and it relayed a few 100 MB without any problems. The bridge is connected to a standard home cable connection in Switzerland (router runs pfSense). Of course the load was not too high due to only running an obfuscated bridge.





After the week I decided to shut the bridge down because I heard from people being contacted by the police even though only running a non-exit relay. As I share a flat with some friends, I absolutely cannot afford being raided or similar. If anyone can give me some advice on running non-exit relays at home in Switzerland, I might consider running the bridge again.





Hope this helps.



Cheers,



Damian





[1] https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions.html.en#instructions



[2] https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#development

[3] http://www.raspberrypi.org/downloads

_______________________________________________

tor-relays mailing list

tor-relays at lists.torproject.org

https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays




_______________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays at lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays 		 	   		   		 	   		  
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20130820/b503f0ba/attachment-0001.html>