[tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?
grarpamp at gmail.com
Thu Nov 29 21:29:44 UTC 2012
It would just seem really frustrating for users who want to participate
in account based sites (and really, what sites aren't) to find themselves
kneejerk blocked at the network level.
Tor is slow, there's really no claim to be made that Tor is capable
of literally DoSing a site. Only one for cranks and spam and abuse.
For which higher layer filters/moderation can work, as does simply
closing the offending account.
So when a way of running an exit appears, such as perhaps this
one, that might mitigate against the kneejerk for those 'good' users
that care to find them... myself, I'd tend to give the world the benefit
of the doubt and run one . It's not like anyone who already
disbelieves in Tor/anon/etc enough to block it is going to donate to Tor
for providing a nice [DNS/consensus] blocklist or stand up amongst
their peers and say 'Tor is some really nice guys'.
As a site admin, Tor is but a speck of trouble compared
to the rest of the IP space. Put yourself in the shoes of a
public service... Facebook, Gmail, forum, whatever... though
Tor might bring some rarer serious issues, that's nothing
compared to the ticket counts of the general moronic public.
 Caveat testing to be done regarding proof for those
needing it via Exonerator, etc.
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