[tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?

tagnaq tagnaq at gmail.com
Sat Nov 24 11:46:44 UTC 2012


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> Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed to use an
> exit IP that is different from it's advertised exit IP in order to
> prevent a simplistic form of blocking based on scraping the
> descriptor set? I think this can happen if the default route is out
> another interface or secondary address. Something of that nature.

Actually I think this is a great idea and allows Tor to be used when
it wasn't possible or painful before.

How does the Torproject and the major Tor network operators think
about it?

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