[tor-relays] Electronic surveillance on major tor exits

[Ted Smith]

On Thu, 2012-07-26 at 18:57 +0100, mick wrote:
> On Mon, 23 Jul 2012 11:03:24 -1000
> Name Withheld <survivd at gmail.com> allegedly wrote:
>  
> > Most Tor users probably don't read the manual and follow best 
> > practices.  I'm sure we've all seen traffic where users are using
> > google maps to find directions from their home, or logging into their
> > true-name mail accounts.  When you combine this "State of our Method"
> > with a choke on the number
> 
> I'm surprised that no-one else seems to have picked up on this. But no,
> "we have /not/ all seen traffic where users" are doing something....
> Because we aren't looking at user's traffic. And we damned well should
> not be.

You don't need to be sniffing exit traffic to see this. I use Tor for a
lot of traffic, including traffic that personally identifies me. That's
not contrary to the purpose of Tor or onion routing in general, which is
to separate routing from identity. My email provider doesn't need to
know where I'm connecting from, even if they know my legal name.

-- 
Sent from Ubuntu
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