[tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays

[Mike Perry]

Thus spake Nils Vogels (bacardicoke at gmail.com):

> On Tue, Jul 24, 2012 at 9:17 AM, Mike Perry <mikeperry at torproject.org>wrote:
> 
> > Thus spake kupo at damnfbi.tk (kupo at damnfbi.tk):
> >
> > > Hey all,
> > > Have you contemplated sending this over to the hackerspaces list?
> >
> > There exists THE list for hackerspaces? Well hot damn. Are these them:
> > http://lists.hackerspaces.org/mailman/listinfo/
> >
> > Also, how do we recognize reputable Hackerspaces from "Sketchy bunch of
> > d00dz who think it will be totally awesome fun to pwn a bunch of Tor
> > users?" Should we check for previous reliable Tor relays from them?
> > Should we just not care?
> 
> It's funny this comes up now :) I know for a fact that most Dutch
> hackerspaces either run a tor node, or have a member running a Tor node.
> Their motives have never been questioned, so why start now :)

Yeah, I was asking a subset of Roger's parent question: "Should we fund
new relays by new people, fund new relays by existing community members,
or fund upgrades to existing relays by existing community members?"

I think if we just start dumping money on total strangers who have never
run Tor exits before, it is less likely to lead to a stable outcome
where those exits continue to exist.

> In most countries there is a foundation covering multiple hackerspaces,
> these are usually where you'd want to start. If you need some more contacts
> in the Benelux and UK area, I can lend a hand.

Good suggestion. I do generally agree that hackerspaces are a great
untapped potential for running more Tor nodes. It is definitely
something that should be explored. Not sure who (if anyone) is tasked
with driving this whole exit sponsoring initiative yet, though.

I also like the idea of favoring larger, better organized hackerspaces
that are more likely to be able to continue to manage their exits over
the long term.


-- 
Mike Perry
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 198 bytes
Desc: Digital signature
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/attachments/20120724/94d403e0/attachment.pgp>