[tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)

[mick]

On Tue, 01 Mar 2011 13:34:23 -0800
Jacob Appelbaum <jacob at appelbaum.net> allegedly wrote:

<snipped>

> 
> > 
> > I am attracted to cmeclax's idea of some form of torrc config option
> > which could limit the potential for deliberate (or accidental but
> > "reckless") scanning. Is there any mileage in pursuing something
> > like that further? And if not, are there any other (current)
> > recommended configurations which could mitigate possible problems?
> > 
> 
> I don't think such a configuration option makes any sense at all. We
> have many streams on a given circuit for load balancing. A clever
> scanner would simply use one circuit per connect attempt and it would
> generate a lot of load on the network.
> 
> I'd suggest that if you're concerned about someone making connections
> from your computer, it's probably a bad idea to run an Exit node...

OK, so that idea may not be a runner - but surely the whole purpose of
the exit policy system is to allow us to run exit nodes which /do/
limit activity to that which we deem acceptable (or legal). 

Mick 

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The text file for RFC 854 contains exactly 854 lines. 
Do you think there is any cosmic significance in this?

Douglas E Comer - Internetworking with TCP/IP Volume 1

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc854.txt
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