Why so little bandwidth used?

Robert Ransom rransom.8774 at gmail.com
Wed Feb 16 20:39:06 UTC 2011


On Wed, 16 Feb 2011 21:07:50 +0100
Klaus Layer <klaus.layer at gmx.de> wrote:

> Lora Roa <hechicera at gmail.com> wrote on 16.02.2011:
> > Same thing, but with a bridge.  Can confirm ports forwarded, hybernate not
> > messing with it.  I though it was just me or some pattern in how my bridge
> > was handed out.
> > 
> > Getting < 1 connection a day now, bandwidth meter reports 7:1 ration of
> > incoming to outgoing.  Which made me recheck and retest all my port forward
> > settings days ago when I saw it start, but I can't figure it out from my
> > end.

> I assume this has something to do with the donated bandwidth. If the donated 
> bandwidth is to low, the relay will (maybe only currently) not being used. 

This does not apply to bridges.


> I have 5 relays running. One at me home DSL connection (3Mb/s download, 
> 512Kb/s upload) with 168 Kb/s donated bandwidth . Average bandwidth usage 
> 15Kb/s. It is almost unused. Another node runs at a cable modem connection 
> (32Mb/s down, 2,5 Mb/s up) and 1,4Mb/s donated bandwidth. Average usage 840 
> Kb/s. Then I have a root server with two instances. One is under the top 40 
> TOR nodes. Heavy usage around the clock always 1500-2000 concurrent 
> connections. Average 20 Mb/s.
> 
> My impression is that from point of view of bandwidth it is useless to have 
> these small relays. Although they help to increase the number of servers and 
> make it more difficult for an attacker to monitor the TOR network.

You're right -- low-bandwidth relays are nearly useless.  For security
reasons, Tor clients must choose the relays in their circuits at
random.  Tor attempts to load-balance circuits across the published
relays by weighting the probability with which clients choose each
relay, but this load-balancing approach cannot make good use of
low-bandwidth relays.

If you want to contribute your bandwidth on a slow (50 kB/s or less)
connection to Tor, consider running a bridge to help users bypass
Internet censorship instead of running a published relay.


Robert Ransom
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