[tor-project] support the torproject with bridges

[teor]

> On 11 Aug 2017, at 07:32, David Fifield <david at bamsoftware.com> wrote:
> 
>> I have set up some Fallbacks of my own choise for the bridges. ok ?
> 
> You mean fallback directories? I don't know, it sounds okay.

Bridges download their first consensus from a fallback (or authority).
Bridges select directory guards from the live consensus.
Clients use the bridge as their only directory guard.

It might also enable some attacks via the bridge's unique set
of fallbacks:
* if all the fallbacks are down, the bridge will use the directory
  authorities (this is ok)
* if all the fallbacks provide outdated consensuses, the bridge might
  go down (this is bad)
* if all the fallbacks provide a restricted set of descriptors, then
  the other descriptors will be fetched from the bridge's directory
  guards (this is ok)

I haven't thought about it much, I think it's ok, but using the
defaults (plus extra fallbacks if you want) could be safer.

T
--
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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