[tor-project] Launching Ethics Guidelines
arma at mit.edu
Thu May 12 01:26:38 UTC 2016
On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 04:15:25PM +0800, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Here's the line about unacceptability of crawling .onion:
> "For example, it is not acceptable to run an HSDir, harvest onion
> addresses, and do a Web crawl of those onion services."
> So, this can indeed be an official policy. But it was the first I had
> heard of it. And currently at least 3-4 tor2web nodes in
> good-standing explicitly permit crawling of .onion .
It is not crawling itself that is bad. If an onion service lets you
fetch a lot of pages at once from it, or it decides to use rate limiting
or require login or whatever to not let you do this rate of fetches,
I think that's a policy decision on the part of the onion service.
What the above notes referred to is running a relay that gets the HSDir
flag, and then writing down the onion addresses that you see on hidden
service descriptors that get uploaded to your relay. People who run
onion services have an expectation of privacy from the HSDir relays,
and we'd like to follow through on it. In the long term that means
the design changes in proposal 224. In the short term it (alas) means
enforcing it via community ways.
Do the tor2web nodes you're talking about do this step? Or did you just
mean "letting people load a lot of pages"?
For more context, see the ethics/safety section of the 32c3 onion
(starting around the 30 minute mark)
("Harvesting" onion addresses that people tell your tor2web website
isn't either of these things, and I'm not sure what I think of it.)
> Teor: Apologies for being dumb, but can you explain why it's bad for
> tor2web-nodes to connect to single-onion services? Both Tor2web and
> Single-onion say IN BIG BOLD LETTERS that using these remove your
> anonymity. Given that these are intentionally meant to be "expert
> features" for people who know what they are doing, I don't immediately
> see a concern sufficiently large that it merits special handling. Can
> you enlighten me?
It puts the relays at new risk. Right now breaking into a rendezvous point
is not useful for linking users to the onion services they visit. If both
sides are using short circuits, then the rendezvous point is acting as a
single-hop proxy. And if we have a design where _sometimes_ the rendezvous
point knows both sides, then it becomes a smart strategy to attack it,
just in case this is one of those times.
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