[tor-project] (FWD) Plan for dropping urras: starts with dizum, Faravahar, dannenberg

Roger Dingledine arma at mit.edu
Fri Jul 1 17:39:21 UTC 2016


Fyi for those wondering about the logistics of rotating directory
authorities (and why it is more complicated and more fragile than you
may have expected :).

--Roger

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> -----

Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2016 13:31:46 -0400
From: Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu>
To: dir-auth at lists.torproject.org
Subject: Plan for dropping urras: starts with dizum, Faravahar, dannenberg

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We're going to do this in three phases.

PHASE ONE: a) dizum, Faravahar, and dannenberg all drop urras from their
DirServers lines. There's no need to synchronize here -- just do it as
soon as you get around to it, and let us know that you did.

PHASE TWO: once all of phase one is done, then moria1, gabelmoo, and
longclaw will do a coordinated switch in the same hour.

PHASE THREE: maatuska and tor26 will switch whenever they like after that.

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Here are all the details so you can follow along with why I think this
will work, and how it can go wrong.

Constraint 1: We have nine dir auths currently, and we need five of them
to agree in order to get a consensus.

Constraint 2: Five of the nine have attached bandwidth authorities,
and we need three bwauths to be part of the consensus at all times.

Constraint 3: Five of them vote on BadExit, and we need at least one
of them in the consensus or we unassign all the BadExit flags. An odd
number of voters (one or three) is better than an even number (two).

Constraint 4: Three of them vote about recommended versions, and we need
at least one of them in the consensus.

Constraint 5: Each authority supports a range of consensus methods
depending on what Tor version it runs. When constructing a consensus,
the authorities choose the largest consensus method supported by more
than 2/3 of the voting authorities for that hour. Now that dizum has
upgraded to Tor 0.2.8.x, we'll have 9 authorities that can do method 20
and 4 authorities that can do method 22, which means we'll pick method
20 so long as there are at least 6 authorities voting. We should make
sure that nobody else upgrades to Tor 0.2.8.x until we've finished, else
we could fall into an edge case where we have enough that we pick method
22, but not enough to get five signatures on the resulting consensus.

Constraint 6: Tor versions before 0.2.8.1-alpha don't believe in
dannenberg's current v3 identity key, and Tor versions before 0.2.4.26
or 0.2.5.11 don't believe in longclaw at all. The dannenberg issue can
be solved by having dannenberg resume voting with its legacy v3 identity
key (I don't know why it stopped -- maybe it never started?), and the
longclaw issue can be solved by declaring that versions that old don't
matter to us.

With that in mind, here are our nine dir auths, with their properties,
grouped into the three phases:

dizum no-bwauth method22
faravahar BWauth method20
dannenberg no-bwauth method20 only-believed-by-0.2.8

moria1 BWauth BadExit recommends-versions method22
gabelmoo BWauth BadExit recommends-versions method22
longclaw BWauth BadExit method20

maatuska BWauth BadExit method20
tor26 no-bwauth BadExit recommends-versions method22
urras no-bwauth method21

So once phase one is complete, we should still have six dir auths
voting, including four bwauths and five badexit voters and two
recommends-versions, and using consensus method 20.

Once phase two is complete, we should have six dir auths voting, including
four bwauths and three badexit voters and two recommends-versions, and
using consensus method 20.

The end of phase two will be the most delicate point, since most deployed
Tors don't believe in dannenberg's new key, so while we will have six
dir auths voting, most clients will consider the resulting consensus to
have only five signatures -- so if anybody drops out we will not have
enough signatures.

Once phase three is complete, we should have eight dir auths
voting, including five bwauths and five badexit voters and three
recommends-versions, and still using consensus method 20.

Whew. Let me know if any of my logic is bad.

--Roger

----- End forwarded message -----



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