<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 28 Jan 2016, at 20:08, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <<a href="mailto:teor2345@gmail.com" class="">teor2345@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><div style="font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class="">Alec, I'd be interested in how Facebook has handled attacks like this against its one-hop onion service (RSOS), which has public IP addresses.</div></div></blockquote></div><br class=""><div class="">We’ve had no IP-level attacks that I am aware of. </div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">We are already generally geared up to deal such attacks on our infrastructure, and because our Onions live in enclaves / are unreachable from “the internet”, living within the infrastructure, such attacks don’t impact the Onion site. </div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Our onions connect out to the internet / to the Tor network through (a cloud of) proxies. This is why RSOS is currently such a good fit for us, because (non-R) Single Onions would require inbound connectivity and thus presumably some mitigation would need to be applied.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class=""> -a</div><div class=""><br class=""></div></body></html>