[tor-onions] Connection to a hidden service with a RFC 6455 web-socket - advice on risks please

Tom Ritter tom at ritter.vg
Tue Mar 6 17:30:52 UTC 2018


On 6 March 2018 at 10:55, Michael Jonker <michael at openpoint.ie> wrote:
> 2) Am I perpetrating a security anti-pattern by holding the connection open
> indeterminately?

Unless I'm missing something: no more so leaving a modern web
application tab (Facebook, gmail) open indefinitely.

Which is to say, WebSockets, Facebook, and Gmail all turn you (the
client) into a server. An attacker (which may be the web server you
are connected to or which may be an outside party sending messages to
you through the server) can choose when and how large a message you
will receive.  This capability is what makes it particularly difficult
to defend against Guard Discovery attacks in Hidden Services, and when
you invert the model (where you are the server) it will enable Guard
Discovery attacks on you the client.

I say this to try to be accurate. I don't say it to discourage you or
suggest you shouldn't do this - I think you should. I think it's
fantastic that you're working on providing a responsive web experience
over a hidden service and I hope to see an awesome deployment or blog
post about it in the future.

-tom


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