[tor-onions] Limits on Next-Gen Hidden Services

[teor]

Hi,

asn has done some great design work on next-generation hidden services,
and has arrived at some size limits:

"- I feel that the max settings imposed by the 50k max size limit, will satisfy
 most crazy hidden service use cases that someone might have wrt scalability
 or number of authed clients. It can support up to 350 authed clients, and 20
 intro points. We should increase the max size limit, if we want to support
 more advanced use cases.

- I also feel the configurations that fit in the default descriptor (of 10k
 bytes blob) will probably satisfy most hidden service use cases out there as
 it can support up to 80 authed clients, and up to 11 intro points.  The
 anonymity set of those hidden services descriptors will be good wrt snooping HSDirs

- Giant hidden service descriptors will stand out and their anonymity set will
 likely be small. I think such giant hidden services should perhaps split
 their info to multiple descriptors using some sort of stealth-auth mechanism
 (where they give different onion address to different clients).
 Alternatively, we should change our padding rules, or always pad to max
 descriptor size."

asn has also made the maximum size a consensus parameter, so it can be
changed if needed.

Please reply to asn's tor-dev email:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-November/011658.html

T

-- 
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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