[tor-onions] SSL certificates for hidden services/.onion domains

shadow shadow at systemli.org
Thu Feb 25 15:33:03 UTC 2016


Can anyone explain the advantages of .onion certs?

As far as I understand the onionservice architecture, the traffic
between the onion service and the client is EndtoEnd-encrypted?

I thought it was a political goal to get recognized (thanks for doing
that) and a userinterface/experience goal to get this shiny green bar,
when connecting to an .onion service.

cheers shadow


On 22.02.2016 17:12, Ron Risley wrote:
> 
>> On Feb 22, 2016, at 06:18, Alec Muffett <alecm at fb.com> wrote:
>>
>> Apologies for contradicting you, but there is nothing "tenuous" about Onion certificates. 
> 
> I don't mind being contradicted. I was responding to articles like this one, which said "these .onion certificates are considered internal name certificates. The CA/Browser Forum has deprecated the use of public SSL Certificates for internal names and they will no longer be allowed after November 1, 2015. "
> 
> https://blog.digicert.com/the-current-state-of-onion-certificates-and-what-happens-next/
> 
> I realize that situation has changed in the past year, with the IETF's official recognition of the .onion space.
> 
> Thanks for the references. They'll help me get up to speed on the current state of things.
> 
> Though I agree about the risk of ghettoization of the .onion space, I also see an opportunity here to avoid some of the pitfalls of the current SSL certificate trust model, specifically with regards to rogue authorities and stolen/forged signing keys.
> 
> Again, thanks...
> 
> --Ron
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> 

-- 
best regards | viele Gruesse, shadow at systemli.org

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gpg --keyserver zimmermann.mayfirst.org --recv-keys 0x5C6B6ED4248C1F32


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