[tor-dev] A new idea for email encryption on tor

Wisdom With Rahul rahulbhatia172 at gmail.com
Fri Nov 13 04:59:10 UTC 2020

This idea is interesting but who owns all the keys?

Thanks and regards!

On Fri 13 Nov, 2020, 6:49 AM Keifer Bly, <keifer.bly at gmail.com> wrote:

> Well, the mechanism is that it overwrites the key ever time, so each
> message has its own unique key, also the receiver needs to verify the key
> file with the built in tool to be able to use it. So an attacker does not
> know this the only way to get this information is from the person that
> created the message as the need when the OS originally generated the
> message, not when it was uploaded as an attachment somewhere. That's what I
> was thinking. I will look into the communities suggested, thanks very much.
> --Keifer
> On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 1:27 PM Santiago Torres-Arias <
> santiago at archlinux.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 11:19:44AM -0800, Keifer Bly wrote:
>> > Hi there,
>> Hello,
>> > So I have a new email encryption system which requires that the user has
>> > the specific key file generated for a message rather than the password,
>> > specifically this software generates a unique key file for a specific
>> > message every time a message is created. The user then enters the date
>> and
>> > time the message was created. Without the original key file the message
>> > can't be opened;
>> >
>> > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0W7OVdNrOA
>> >
>> > Here is a video showing the software. I've built it for Windows and Mac
>> OS.
>> > I was wondering if this could be implemented in tor. I think it would
>> be an
>> > interesting idea for a tor based email system to make the messages
>> > unrecoverable after use.
>> I'm not a tor-dev, so I can't comment on the interest, but it appears to
>> me that the value added of this idea (basically, using time to seed a
>> PRF/KDF) is very little. All in all, using time to seed keys is not the
>> best idea. It also seems to be on top of PGP, so I'm pretty convinced
>> this doesn't provide perfect forward-secrecy unless you're layering any
>> sort of session key ratcheting mechanism yourself.
>> I think the goal is laudable, but I suggest getting a little bit more
>> involved in cryptography engineering communities to see learn, develop
>> and eventually help change the status quo.
>> Cheers!
>> -S
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