[tor-dev] Tor Network Expansion Question/Suggestion

Beecher Bruno beecherbruno1 at gmail.com
Sat May 9 23:16:27 UTC 2020


Hello All,

I don’t know much in the ways of how the actual coding works, but I’m very
familiar with computers. I’m a student in Network Systems Engineering
Technology in the USA. After being introduced to Tor several years ago, I
loved it. I recently had a potentially good idea in making the Tor network
more resilient against tracking/surveillance attempts.

My basic understanding is that information from one computer gets
transmitted to a node, bounced around between different nodes, and then
spit out somewhere else. Or, at least, that’s what it would look like from
the outside, making it extremely difficult to pin down the actual origin
computer. (Please do forgive me if this is an inaccurate representation).

But what about expanding the network significantly, without truly widening
the load on all the nodes?

My idea was essentially this: an app for mobile devices and/or computers
that would ask for consent from the user. Upon consent, that device could
essentially fake its identity, so that everyone outside the network thought
it was a node? Data that’s actually sent between nodes could just put in a
random “fake” node at the beginning and end of a packet so, as far as
anyone else knows, that data went through an extra two nodes?

Just in case that’s not clear, imagine a Tor node receives packet A in
Washington DC. On its complicated, 3 node journey to the end node in
Hongkong, random devices that have been consented to be “fake nodes” will
have added themselves in. Theoretically, by the time it arrives in
Hongkong, this 5 node journey (DC Hongkong and the 3 in between) will look
on the outside to be a 6 or 7 node journey.

I’m not sure if this is possible, but if it is, I think it could help
protect people’s privacy even more.

I do apologize for emailing this list, I couldn’t exactly find an “Contact
Us” page, probably for good reason.

Have a great day!

Stay safe out there.

Beecher
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