[tor-dev] [Tails-dev] Tails vs the capacity of the Meek bridges

Iain Learmonth irl at torproject.org
Tue Mar 24 10:56:56 UTC 2020


On 20/03/2020 15:30, sajolida wrote:
>> In Tails' threat model it is assumed that adversaries monitor the default bridges provided by the Tor Browser, and that our users want to avoid detection of that, so we are not interested in adding the default bridges to Tails
> We're not offering the default bridges in Tails also because it's
> impossible right now to store your bridge configuration in the
> Persistent Storage.

Maybe I've overlooked something obvious, but could you use Moat?


This would use meek to fetch the bridges, but then you have non-default
bridges for the rest of the session. It can be automated as part of the
Tor start-up, but you do need to solve a CAPTCHA.


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