[tor-dev] Proposal for PoW DoS defenses during introduction (was Re: Proposal 305: ESTABLISH_INTRO Cell DoS Defense Extension)
lye at math.uni-bremen.de
Thu Jun 13 13:28:00 UTC 2019
>> 2.Client computes POW.
>> Generates random 8 bytes key (ClientKey).
>> Generates hash(sha512/256 or sha3??) of
>> hash(IPKey + ClientKey)
>> } while (hash does not start with "abcde")
> That looks like a naive PoW scheme. It would perhaps be preferable to
> try to find a GPU/ASIC-resistant or memory-hard PoW scheme here, to
> minimize the advantage of adversaries with GPUs etc.? Are there any
> good such schemes?
It may be worth looking at Argon2  which is designed to maximize the
cost of password cracking on ASICs based on memory-hard functions.
A different approach is the input-dependent use of several different
hash functions (cf. e.g. ).
> Also services should definitely be able to configure the difficulty of
> the PoW, and IMO this should again happen through the descriptor.
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