[tor-dev] Dealing with frequent suspends on Android

Michael Rogers michael at briarproject.org
Wed Nov 21 22:10:02 UTC 2018

On 20/11/2018 19:28, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Hi!  I don't know if this will be useful or not, but I'm wondering if
> you've seen this ticket:
>   https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28335
> The goal of this branch is to create a "dormant mode" where Tor does
> not run any but the most delay- and rescheduling-tolerant of its
> periodic events.  Tor enters this mode if a controller tells it to, or
> if (as a client) it passes long enough without user activity.  When in
> dormant mode, it doesn't disconnect from the network, and it will wake
> up again if the controller tells it to, or it receives a new client
> connection.
> Would this be at all helpful for any of this?

This looks really useful for mobile clients, thank you!

The comments on the pull request
(https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/502) suggest that Tor won't
enter dormant mode if it's running a hidden service. Are there any plans
to support that in future?

One of the comments mentions a break-even point for consensus diffs,
where it costs less bandwidth to fetch a fresh consensus than all the
diffs from the last consensus you know about. Are diffs likely to remain
available up to the break-even point, or are there times when it would
be cheaper to use diffs, but you have to fetch a fresh consensus because
some of the diffs have expired? Essentially I'm wondering whether we'd
want to wake Tor from dormant mode occasionally to fetch diffs before
they expire, so we can avoid fetching a fresh consensus later.

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