[tor-dev] Setting NumEntryGuards=2
florentin.rochet at uclouvain.be
Wed Mar 28 08:44:41 UTC 2018
On 2018-03-26 20:34, Mike Perry wrote:
> Florentin Rochet:
>> On 2018-03-20 04:57, Mike Perry wrote:
>>> Arguments for staying with just one guard:
>>> 1. One guard means less observability.
>>> As Roger put it in the above blog post: "I think the analysis of the
>>> network-level adversary in Aaron's paper is the strongest argument for
>>> restricting the variety of Internet paths that traffic takes between the
>>> Tor client and the Tor network."
>>> Furthermore, I believe that conflux will also be useful against traffic
>>> analysis and congestion attacks. Since the load balancing is dynamic and
>>> hard to predict by an external observer, traffic correlation and website
>>> traffic fingerprinting attacks will become harder, because the adversary
>>> can no longer be sure what percentage of the traffic they have seen
>>> (depending on their position and other potential concurrent activity).
>>> Similarly, it should also help dampen congestion attacks, since traffic
>>> will automatically shift away from a congested guard.
>> I am really enthusiast about multipath, either at the Tor level or even at
>> the transport level: we discussed QUIC at the meeting, but MultipathQUIC
>> could also be a long-term option now that we discuss more than 1 entry
>> However, I would argue that it does not really help against traffic
>> correlation. Our paper at pets18 exploits Tor's forward compatibility
>> feature to design silent cheap, almost instantaneous and perfect active
>> traffic confirmation that does not care about user traffic to succeed.
>> See Section 5,
> In this case, Tor's forward compatibility is a bug. The Tor protocol is
> now versioned at the feature layer, so Postel-style permissive forward
> compatibility is no longer required:
> I have been bothered by the types of side channels you discuss in that
> paper for some time. They are tricky to remove, but not impossible.
> See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25574 and the child
> ticket and associated branch.
Great! Roger indeed told me you were exploring similar problems. As you
said, it's tricky to remove because of false positives and because you
loose protocol flexibility, and it is not clear to me what the
consequences can be over the years. I think we can reason about this as
a scalability problem, not in size, but in *time* with its underlying
technical issues and security concerns depending on how much we scale
the protocol flexibility.
It is not really this thread's topic, so I prefer not to talk too much
here, but I would be glad to discuss more those problems or to help on
any proposal design, and code. Just ping me on IRC :) (Jaym).
> Your paper also states that you got multiplier effects from various
> issues with Tor's protocol, which improved your results. If we remove
> these multiplier effects by fixing the protocol and behavior, then it
> seems to me that adaptive traffic routing will add further uncertainty
> to congestion-based attacks.
Hard to tell, even if the intuition is on your side. It's probably
possible to come up with something smarter than the various attacks I
did. We will definitely need another round of analysis after any
While I feel that the various 'multiplier effects' should be removed, I
don't really like the approach "patch the weaknesses quick and move on",
often we miss to understand the root cause of the various problems, and
we end up to add complexity to the software while there might be
something better to do.
>> Maybe the real debate would be to discuss what's the major threat between
>> active/passive attackers, and what do we care about? The question is, why
>> should we care about hardening passive attacker's work when the active form
>> is always as easy?
> To your point: because I believe it is possible to make both active and
> passive attacker's jobs hard. I also believe that when we look deeply
> enough, we will find that improvements that make an active attacker's
> task harder will also improve things against many, if not all, classes of
> passive attacker.
> Roger made a related point that I want to inject here, so I remember to
> pick it up in the proposal: Roger said that we should consider active vs
> passive observers here. He contended that against passive observers, one
> guard is always better, and that we should not discount that benefit
> while considering an active attacker making circuits via a second guard.
> However, there are two main issues with calling the
> Tor-sometimes-uses-a-second-guard "attack" fully "active":
> 1. It is not always active. In day-to-day operation, clients will use a
> second guard whenever they pick an exit that is in the same family or
> /16 of their primary guard (this is because Tor rightly chooses exits
> first, to avoid leaking guard node choice via exit node choice). Clients
> will also do this when an onion service's IP, HSDIR, or RP is in the
> same /16 or family as their primary guard, or actually is that guard. In
> these cases, they will perform a request over a second guard, with no
> benefit from multiplexing it with other traffic. For clients unlucky
> enough to choose guards in popular /16s or in big families, they will be
> using secondary guards for unmultiplexed activity quite frequently.
> 2. The active observer and the passive observers here are independent
> actors. The passive observers can be logging connection activity simply
> due to the default configuration of their network routers. Active
> adversaries do not need their collusion in this attack to get the full
> benefit from being active -- they merely need to have the ability to ask
> passive observers for the logs they already have, independent of the
Also, I believe that there is a common misconception about the strength
of a passive adversary against the Tor network. The passive adversary
needs to see a sufficient amount of data to keep false positives quite
low, and to have a reasonable chance of success, while the active form
does not really care about such constraints (depending on the kind of
confirmation attack, though). From my observations, most of Tor's
traffic is short and unlikely to deliver enough information to a passive
observer. Can a passive attacker correlates efficiently on the real
network while most of Tor's flow size is below ~ 2000 cells? So, I don't
feel that slightly increasing the surface area of passive adversaries is
problematic right now, and as you said, the multiplexing effect of
multipath may make their job even harder. I am more concerned by the
increasing surface area of active attackers, and you seem to argue that
the current situation "Tor-sometimes-uses-a-second-guard" is not fully
active? So, moving to two guards favors active attackers compared to the
current situation, right? I still believe that this problem can be
balanced with our proposal, and that the opportunities raised by
multipath circuits also worth such loss.
>> For website fingerprinting, it does seem to be interesting if the attack
>> cannot link the two paths :)
> This is by far the easiest argument to make for both the switch to two
> guards, the switch to conflux, and for the addition of padding: we know
> from the research literature on website traffic fingerprinting that more
> multiplexing reduces attacker accuracy. Both conflux and always-on two
> guards increase overall multiplexing, and eliminate cases where lack of
> multiplexing bites us hard.
> However, the mere fact that this is true against website traffic
> fingerprinting suggests to me that increased multiplexing and traffic
> splitting is useful in other traffic analysis scenarios.
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