[tor-dev] OnionGatherer: evaluating status of hidden services

simone raponi raponi.1539620 at studenti.uniroma1.it
Fri Mar 10 20:02:08 UTC 2017


2017-03-10 21:13 GMT+01:00 ng0 <contact.ng0 at cryptolab.net>:

> Massimo La Morgia transcribed 6.7K bytes:
> > On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 5:39 PM, David Fifield <david at bamsoftware.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 12:58:55PM +0100, Massimo La Morgia wrote:
> > > > we are a research group at Sapienza University, Rome, Italy. We do
> > > research on
> > > > distributed systems, Tor, and the Dark Web. As part of our work, we
> have
> > > > developed OnionGatherer, a service that gives up-to-date information
> > > about Dark
> > > > Web hidden services to Tor users.
> > >
> > > ...and presumably helps you build a crowdsourced list of onion services
> > > that you plan to use for some other research purpose?
> > >
> >
> > yes, of course in this way we are building a crowdsourced list of onion
> > services, but is not really different from onion directories.
> > At this time we have no plan for other research that use this
> crowdsourced
> > list.
> >
> >
> > >
> > > If you're planning a research project on Tor users, you should write to
> > > the research safety board and get ideas about how ot do it in a way
> that
> > > minimizes risk.
> > > https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard.html
> > >
> > >
> > thank you for the suggestion.
> >
> >
> > > This idea seems, to me, to have a lot of privacy problems. You're
> asking
> > > people to use Chrome instead of Tor Browser, which means they will be
> > > vulnerable to a lot of fingerprinting and trivial deanonymization
> > > attacks.
> >
> >
> > No we are not asking people to use chrome for browsing on tor, but we are
> > offering a service that can help them to know if a onion address is up
> > before start to surf with Tor Browser
>
> Having only an extension for Chrome based browsers implies asking users
> to use Chrome based browsers. If there were a choice between Firefox and
> Chrome extensions, it would be less clear and not implying.
>

Yes, you're right, but we have created this extension in order to offer a
service to people.
We chose to start with Chrome because it has a greater number of users.
We would be happy if it will be used and also developed for Firefox.


> > > Your extension reports not only the onion domains that it
> > > finds, but also the URL of the page you were browsing at the time:
> > >         var onionsJson = JSON.stringify({onions:onions, website:
> > > window.location.href});
> > > You need to at least inform your research subjects/users what of their
> > > private data you are storing and what you are doing with it.
> > >
> >
> > As you can see from the source code we are not storing any sensitive data
> > like ip or users information. do you think that only URL page can damage
> > user privacy?
>
> This aside, do you just check if the page still exists or the top level
> onion domain you found this page on? If so, this would be an improvement
> I'd suggest, to only use the toplevel domain.
> I have not looked at your code.
>

Thank you for the suggestion, we'll improve the website's URL management
asap.

>
> >
> >
> >
> > > You're using two different regexes for onion URLs that aren't the same.
> > > The one used during replacement doesn't match "https", so I guess it
> > > will fail on URLs like https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/.
> > >         /^(http(s)?:\/\/)?.{16}(\.onion)\/?.*$/
> > >         /(http:\/\/)?\b[\w\d]{16}\.onion(\/[\S]*|)/
> > >
> >
> > Yes, you right, thank you for the feedback.
>
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-dev mailing list
> > tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
>
>
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