[tor-dev] Using bridges in different /16s

teor teor2345 at gmail.com
Thu Dec 21 23:02:30 UTC 2017

Hi all,

If bridges users configure at least two bridges in different /16s,
it makes it harder to run some kinds of statistical attacks on the
paths that they build through the Tor network. (For example,
working out that relays in that /16 are never used by the client.)

For context, see this Twitter thread:

I think that:
* most of the current default Tor Browser bridges are in at least two
   /16s, except for the single-bridge pluggable transports,
* almost all the 3-bridge sets given out by BridgeDB are in at least
   two /16s.

Should we:
* document this as a recommendation? Where?
* add code to Tor that warns when it isn't true? (Maybe not?)
* make sure all of the Tor Browser bridges are across two or
  three /16s?
* make sure BridgeDB gives out bridge sets in two or three


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