[tor-dev] GSoC: Support all kinds of DNS queries

Daniel Achleitner daniel.achleitner at gmail.com
Mon Apr 3 02:26:52 UTC 2017

On 2017-04-02 05:22, Jeremy Rand wrote:
> (Thinking out loud.)  It would be interesting to have some kind of
> algorithm agility here.  For example, a Tor client could send a
> request for a Namecoin domain name, and the exit relay would return a
> Namecoin merkle proof in the same way that it would return a DNSSEC
> signature if were a DNS doman name.

It certainly seems to be a good idea to design the cell format to be
agnostic as to what kind of "proof data" is attached to the DNS
response. As prop219 just wraps around the existing DNS-packet
wire-format, it should already allow that, provided that Namecoin has a
wire-format for the proof.

Certainly out of scope for GSoC, but I'm wondering:
Apart from running a full Namecoin node (and storing the whole
blockchain) on every client/exit node/whatever, is there a
privacy-preserving way to resolve a .bit domain, i.e. without an
upstream node/resolver learning/logging exactly which domain was resolved?


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