[tor-dev] Sibyls: introducing AS-level sign-up rate limits, per relay caps, family-level caps
nusenu at openmailbox.org
Sat Mar 26 23:43:16 UTC 2016
> denial of service risk
> To prevent trivial dos attacks where an attacker with a single IP
> generates several new relay fingerprints until the entire AS is blocked
> from adding new relays for a few hours these relays should come from
> distinct IP addresses.
That actually opens a possibility to bypass the entire rate limiting by
creating all keys with a single IP and then distribute them to the
actual IPs, but it would still be limited to 2x24 new
relays/fingerprints per day.
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