[tor-dev] Entry/Exit node selection

Evan d'Entremont evan at evandentremont.com
Fri Jan 22 02:36:15 UTC 2016


Retain connection information within the network, or ourside?

Either way, aren't they already logging tbat you'rw using tor?

On Mon, Jan 18, 2016, 6:24 PM Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> On 19 Jan 2016, at 04:53, Evan d'Entremont <evan at evandentremont.com>
> wrote:
>
> What threat is Tor trying to defeat? Region locking or nation states? If
> the former, then great, select an exit country, or just use a VPN. If the
> latter, perhaps that actual threat profile should be taken into account.
>
> Is there any reason why Tor doesn't select exit nodes which are as close
> as possible to the intended host?
>
> If I connect to Tor and request a resource from a server on ISP A, would
> in not make sense to enforce an exit node also on ISP A, or if not, as
> close as possible?
>
> As well, entry guards should be as close as possible to the user, limiting
> the ability of others to log the connection.
>
> In short, it's safer that only my ISP see a connection rather than my ISP,
> a backbone provider, the entry guard's ISP, etc. Systems like XKeyscore
> wouldn't even see the traffic in this case. It seems that selecting an exit
> country may actually be detrimental to anonymity by forcing traffic over
> the (monitored) internet backbone.
>
>
> It depends on your threat model.
>
> My country requires ISPs to retain connection information, so choosing a
> nearby entry to me, and a nearby exit to a website in this country, would
> be very detrimental to my anonymity.
>
> Tim
>
> Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
>
> teor2345 at gmail dot com
> PGP 968F094B
>
> teor at blah dot im
> OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F
>
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