[tor-dev] stopping the censoring of tor users.

Fri Feb 26 15:36:42 UTC 2016

i wonder if you could recommend me what i can do to make such a thing, or
someone who can, you see i am an it student and im eager to learn how i can
make these kind of things and contribute to the tor project, but i need
help from other people to accomplish this.

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On 26 February 2016 at 14:53, Michael Rogers <michael at briarproject.org>
wrote:

> As far as I can tell, this would work, and you could do it without any
> changes to the Tor network. Just set up a hidden service where the
> service is an open proxy.
>
> It wouldn't be transparent to clients, however - they'd need to do some
> proxychains-style juggling to connect to their local onion proxy, then
> connect through that to your hidden service, then connect through that
> to the internet. You could of course create a library to do the extra
> work on the client side - but the point is, it wouldn't work for
> unmodified clients.
>
> But perhaps the bigger problem with hidden exit nodes is that when
> someone does something illegal through your exit node and the police
> come to your door, you can't point to the public list of exit nodes and
> say "It wasn't me, I'm just an exit node". The best you can do is point
> to the hidden exit nodes library and say "It might not have been me,
> anyone could be an exit node".
>
> Cheers,
> Michael
>
> On 25/02/16 22:06, blacklight . wrote:
> > About the issue of exit nodes needing to know to which bridge they need
> > to connect to,  could we not make a system that similair to hidden
> > services, so that the nodes can connect to them without knowing the
> > actulle ip adress? If we could design an automatic system in which flash
> > proxies could be configered like that, then it might work i think, what
> > are your thoughts?
> >
> > Op 25 feb. 2016 22:37 schreef "Thom Wiggers" <torlists at thomwiggers.nl
> > <mailto:torlists at thomwiggers.nl>>:
> >
> >     You may be interested in the following from the FAQ:
> >
> >     https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits
> >
> >     You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the
> exits.
> >
> >     There are a few reasons we don't:
> >
> >     a) We can't help but make the information available, since Tor
> >     clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers"
> >     want it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell
> >     clients about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make
> >     a lot of connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of
> >     the addresses they see.
> >     b) If people want to block us, we believe that they should be
> >     allowed to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow
> >     Tor users to connect to them, but people have the right to decide
> >     who their services should allow connections from, and if they want
> >     to block anonymous users, they can.
> >     c) Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a
> >     persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by
> >     Tor. Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about
> >     whether they really want to eliminate private access to their
> >     system, and if not, what other options they might have. The time
> >     they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend
> >     rethinking their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.
> >
> >     On 25/02/16 20:04, blacklight . wrote:
> >>     hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought
> >>     of giving it a try.
> >>
> >>     i was lately reading an article
> >>     (
> http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html
> )
> >>      and it was about tor users getting blocked from accessing alot of
> >>     website. but after giving this some thought i think i came up with
> >>     a possible solution to the problem :there is a thing called
> >>     bridges, they are used to access the tor network without your isp
> >>     knowing that you use tor, but if you can use those proxies to
> >>     enter the network, it might also be possible to exit the network
> >>     with them. But then we face a second challenge, the exit nodes
> >>     have to be configured in such a way that it will relay traffic to
> >>     such a bridge, so the exit node owners also need to know the ip of
> >>     the bridge. While this doesn't seem difficult to do, it can become
> >>     difficult. You see if the bridges are published on a public
> >>     list(like normal bridges are) then the blocking sites in question
> >>     will be able to block those address too. While this also posses a
> >>     problem, a possible solution could be found in something called
> >>     flashproxies, flashproxies are bridges with a really short life
> >>     span, they are created and destroyed fairly swiftly, when this is
> >>     done in a rapid pace, they become really hard to block because the
> >>     ip changes all the time. So if the exit nodes can be configured to
> >>     make use of such flash proxies, then the problem could be solved.
> >>     I Must admit that not an expert on this or anything, and it needs
> >>     alot of more thought, but it could work. so i was wondering if
> >>     there are any experts who could help me with thinking out this
> >>     subject and maybe confirm if this idea could work.
> >>
> >>
> >>     greetings, blacklight
> >>
> >>
> >>     _______________________________________________
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> >>     tor-dev at lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-dev at lists.torproject.org>
> >>     https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
> >
> >
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> >
> >
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