[tor-dev] stopping the censoring of tor users.

blacklight . pandakaasftw at gmail.com
Thu Feb 25 22:06:33 UTC 2016

About the issue of exit nodes needing to know to which bridge they need to
connect to,  could we not make a system that similair to hidden services,
so that the nodes can connect to them without knowing the actulle ip
adress? If we could design an automatic system in which flash proxies could
be configered like that, then it might work i think, what are your thoughts?
Op 25 feb. 2016 22:37 schreef "Thom Wiggers" <torlists at thomwiggers.nl>:

> You may be interested in the following from the FAQ:
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits
> You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits.
> There are a few reasons we don't:
> a) We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients
> need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they can
> get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the list of
> relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections through Tor
> to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
> b) If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to
> do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to
> connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services
> should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users,
> they can.
> c) Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive
> response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving them the
> option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they really want to
> eliminate private access to their system, and if not, what other options
> they might have. The time they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor,
> they may instead spend rethinking their overall approach to privacy and
> anonymity.
> On 25/02/16 20:04, blacklight . wrote:
> hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought of
> giving it a try.
> i was lately reading an article (
> http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html
> )
>  and it was about tor users getting blocked from accessing alot of
> website. but after giving this some thought i think i came up with a
> possible solution to the problem :there is a thing called bridges, they are
> used to access the tor network without your isp knowing that you use tor,
> but if you can use those proxies to enter the network, it might also be
> possible to exit the network with them. But then we face a second
> challenge, the exit nodes have to be configured in such a way that it will
> relay traffic to such a bridge, so the exit node owners also need to know
> the ip of the bridge. While this doesn't seem difficult to do, it can
> become difficult. You see if the bridges are published on a public
> list(like normal bridges are) then the blocking sites in question will be
> able to block those address too. While this also posses a problem, a
> possible solution could be found in something called flashproxies,
> flashproxies are bridges with a really short life span, they are created
> and destroyed fairly swiftly, when this is done in a rapid pace, they
> become really hard to block because the ip changes all the time. So if the
> exit nodes can be configured to make use of such flash proxies, then the
> problem could be solved. I Must admit that not an expert on this or
> anything, and it needs alot of more thought, but it could work. so i was
> wondering if there are any experts who could help me with thinking out this
> subject and maybe confirm if this idea could work.
> greetings, blacklight
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