[tor-dev] blacklisting relays with end-to-end correlation capabilities?

Sebastian Hahn hahn.seb at web.de
Fri Dec 9 12:04:46 UTC 2016

> On 08 Dec 2016, at 15:02, nusenu <nusenu at openmailbox.org> wrote:
>> If we did this, also why would we blacklist the nonexit relays? That
>> seems to not make sense, as a relay operator could have multiple relays
>> that act as guard and exit simultaneously.
> Exit relays with the guard flag have usually a guard probability of 0%
> according to onionoo. Since exit capacity is harder to get I was
> suggesting to blacklist the guard-only relays of such groups, so the
> exit capacity could still be used while breaking the end-to-end
> capabilities (if we can assume onionoo's guard_probability to be correct).

This is not guaranteed by the design.

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